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Recession in South East Europe:  
Is there some space for policy manoeuvre?
1  For the purpose of the text SEE countries include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Serbia. 
2 All data in the text if not expressly mentioned otherwise are from EBRD (2008).
The majority of countries in South East Europe (SEE)1 
have been living above their means, neglecting the ne-
cessity for fiscal consolidation, lagging behind in insti-
tutional reforms and now, in the recession, they cannot 
afford fiscal stimulus. Unfortunately, these countries do 
have to engage in fiscal retrenchment. This text tries to 
investigate the possible space for policy manoeuvre. It 
argues for more cautious monetary policy, elaborates the 
challenges of fiscal policy and gives some recommen-
dations for one of the countries – Croatia – hoping that 
some of the suggestions might be found of relevance in 
some other SEE countries. 
Living above their means
As stated for Croatia many times already (e. g. Ott, 2009), 
the majority of SEE countries are confronted with prob-
lems that they should have tackled a long time ago as 
they have been living above their means for too long and 
now they have to pay international and domestic bills 
that are becoming more and more expensive. This can 
easily be supported by the following considerations:
The estimate for the average general government ex-•	
penditures across the region in 2007 was 40% GDP 
(ranging from 48% in Croatia and 45% in Macedonia 
to 29% in Albania);
Estimated regional budgetary deficit for 2008 was •	
1.5% GDP (from 3.7% surplus in Bulgaria to 5.2% defi-
cit in Albania);
It is not strange that the average public debt in the re-•	
gion in 2008 was 31% GDP (the highest was 54% in 
Albania and the lowest 14% in Bulgaria);
However, the average external debt in the region for •	
2007 was 42% GDP (105% in Bulgaria and 89% in 
Croatia as against 18% in Montenegro and 26% in 
Albania).2
Neglecting fiscal consolidation
Unfortunately, in the times of prosperity, while GDP 
growth was favourable – averaging for the region 5.7% 
per year in the period 2001-2007 – the general govern-
ment expenditure share of GDP across the region decrea-
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3  EBRD transition indicators show countries’ positions on the transition path and enable cross-country comparisons. The indicators are in a range from little 
or no progress in transition (indicator 1) to standards equivalent to those of a hypothetical advanced market economy (indicator 4 plus).
sed less than one percentage point on average. These 
shares even increased 5 percentage points in Montene-
gro and 4.4 percentage points in Serbia. Although there 
are exceptions – such as Macedonia where the expendi-
ture share of GDP decreased 6 percentage points – it is 
obvious that the majority of SEE governments were not 
concentrated enough on fiscal consolidation, on decreas-
ing public expenditures and on carrying out the neces-
sary institutional reforms. 
Lagging behind in institutional reforms
The EBRD (2008) nicely explains the pace of institution-
al reforms in SEE countries. Average transition scores 
within the region vary: Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania 
scoring around 3.5, Albania and Macedonia around 3, 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia 
around 2.8.3 Particularly indicative is that all SEE coun-
tries score rather poorly in governance and enterprise re-
structuring (only Croatia scoring 3, all others scoring 
from 2 to minus 3).
Now, in the worst possible circumstances countries have to 
Improve competitiveness•	  in which they all score poor-
ly (only Croatia and Romania scoring a meagre minus 
3, all others scoring around 2);
Decrease budget deficits•	  – the 2008 regional average 
budgetary deficit was equivalent to »only« 1.5% of 
GDP. However, the budgetary deficit was 5.2% in Al-
bania, 2.8% in Romania and 2.5% in Serbia, while only 
Bulgaria and Montenegro had budgetary surpluses; 
Decrease current account deficits•	  – the 2008 region-
al average current account deficit was equivalent to 
17% of GDP, ranging from 37% in Montenegro to 9.7% 
in Macedonia. None of the SEE countries had current 
account surpluses in that year, or in the ten previous 
years (and probably even longer);
Accumulate funds to re•	 pay their debts. 
Fiscal retrenchment instead of fiscal 
stimulus 
Obviously there is no place for fiscal stimulus or for dis-
cussions about what the USA and Germany are doing at 
the moment. The majority of SEE countries are con-
strained with current account deficits, high indebted-
ness, unbalanced budgets and some of them with unfa-
vourable demographic prospects. Acquiring funding 
abroad is difficult and expensive because of poor fiscal 
situation which is affecting their credit ratings. Further-
more, like many other emerging market economies, SEE 
countries suffer from »original sin«, i.e. they are not de-
veloped enough to be able to borrow abroad in their own 
currencies. 
With high government expenditures SEE countries need 
fiscal retrenchment.
When necessary governments could or even should sup-
port the banks, but supporting companies and industries 
in these circumstances might be very tricky:
Nobody knows how long this recession might last and •	
how much any possible fiscal stimulus might cost SEE-
country taxpayers.
Is the recession really the source of the problems of •	
these companies or are some of them doomed to fail 
anyway?
Lobbying, corruption and nepotism are already pro-•	
nounced in the region and fiscal stimulus might bring 
additional injustices and inefficiencies, a surge of cor-
ruption, as well as protectionism in neighbouring coun-
tries. 
Thinking about Croatian tourism for example, nobody 
knows how many tourists will not come to Croatia be-
cause of the recession and how many because of inade-
quate services and high prices. Why should the Croatian 
tourist sector try to be more productive and more effi-
cient than for instance the Greek tourist sector if Croatian 
taxpayers are willing to pay for the difference in prices 
caused by this sector’s low productivity and inefficien-
cies? 
Policy space: Does it exist?
A draft document prepared by the OECD for a recent 
meeting of the SEE Investment Committee (---, 2009) 
enumerates various possible and actual measures that 
could be, and in some cases have been, undertaken by 
SEE countries. When it comes to the currency depreci-
ation it concludes that »however, for some countries de-
preciation is not an option because their currencies are 
pegged to the euro«. One can only agree with that state-
ment. It is true that all SEE countries have to improve 
competitiveness; however when countries have low ef-
ficiency and poor product iveness their competitiveness 
cannot be remedied by currency depreciation, irrespec-
tive of whether it is pegged to the euro or not. Besides, 
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currency depreciation can invoke protectionism in other 
countries and cause problems with repayment of loans 
denominated in foreign currency. In the end, deprecia-
tion could provoke inflation and further destabilize frag-
ile economies. Competitiveness could be improved 
through enabling conditions for more open trade and in-
vestment and for increasing efficiency and productive-
ness. Measures could involve more flexible labour laws, 
more flexible working hours, and in some countries a 
better basic infrastructure. 
Time for a more cautious monetary 
policy
As reviewed in the aforementioned OECD draft docu-
ment, among the possible monetary measures that could 
be contemplated – or have been implemented in some 
SEE countries – are the following:
»Measures to increase liquidity and boost credit to •	
households and firms, such as cutting main policy rates 
or reducing minimum reserve requirements«. Increas-
ing liquidity and improving the structure of the debt 
are certainly good measures. However, having in mind 
the already high indebtedness, one should be careful 
and think of the optimal level of indebtedness too. 
»Measures to encourage lending in local currency«. •	
The same as above; it is good to improve the structure 
of the debt. However, although it might seem that, in 
view of the level of development and total indebted-
ness, particularly of the private sector, these countries 
did not step over the optimal level of indebtedness, they 
should still carefully watch the optimal level of their 
indebtedness. 
»Measures to prevent potential bank runs, like increas-•	
ing guaranteed sums or scrapping taxes on savings«. 
Countries have to have stable banking systems and 
measures aimed at stabilizing banking systems could 
be considered a horizontal aid that benefits everybody. 
In that sense scrapping taxes on savings are welcome, 
while increasing guaranteed sums could be tricky. In 
countries with poor confidence in banks, increased 
guarantees might improve trust. However, they might 
also increase moral hazard. 
»More cautious monetary policy« is certainly the best •	
advice possible in these times, particularly in coun-
tries in which there are big pressures to depreciate the 
local currency. 
Challenges of fiscal policy
When it comes to fiscal policy, the same OECD document 
emphasizes the limited room for fiscal manoeuvre for 
more or less the same reasons as stated above and again 
enumerates possible and actually undertaken measures.
Certainly the best measure is, as the document states, to 
»increase spending efficiency by e.g. cutting public ad-
ministration costs, urging state-owned enterprises to de-
vise saving plans or reducing the rate of public sector 
wage increases and pensions«. However, weak, usually 
coalition, governments tend to be blackmailed by users 
of public funds. At the same time, public sector salaries 
and social benefits – which in the majority of SEE coun-
tries comprise the biggest share of expenditures – are 
presented as mandatory budgetary items, which is actu-
ally not true. Only debt payments are mandatory items 
and even they could be postponed, although it would not 
be wise to suggest that at the moment. Increases in pub-
lic sector salaries and social benefits are the consequence 
of long-term pressures from trade unions, pensioners and 
other users, and in some of these countries also of war 
veterans. As these agreements were made and decisions 
and laws were passed, so new agreements could be made 
and new laws passed. But just as these agreements and 
decisions were made and laws were passed, so new 
agreements and laws could be put in place in their stead. 
Even without agreements, governments could pass new 
laws, as the government of Ireland did recently when it 
could not reach consensus for fiscal consolidation with 
trade unions and employers. 
And when governments decide to cut public servants’ 
salaries (for example) it is wrong to promise an automat-
ic increase of salaries when the economy recovers, to 
guarantee jobs in the public sector and to decrease sala-
ries by an equal percentage for everybody, as in that case, 
sooner or later, countries will find themselves in the 
same situation again. Unfortunately, the new proposal 
of the law on public sector salaries in Croatia4 promises 
exactly that: keeping jobs and full employment, for at 
least two years and it is obvious that salaries will be de-
creased proportionally. 
Some SEE countries like Macedonia and Montenegro 
are giving tax breaks and capital investment tax expen-
ditures to some industries like construction. Unfortu-
nately, such selective preferential treatments might fur-
ther increase distortions and inefficiencies and deepen 
budgetary imbalance. Some countries, like Serbia, have 
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introduced temporary new property, luxury items and 
capital gains taxes. This kind of populist, marginal tax 
cannot substantially increase budget revenues. When 
governments decide to increase taxation the best way is 
to increase the standard VAT rate and, where they are 
present, replace the zero rates with the reduced VAT 
rates. The latter, for countries that are aligning their tax 
systems with the EU requirements, is a necessary move 
anyway. VAT is the highest yielding, simplest, most neu-
tral, the least expensive-to-collect kind of taxation and 
is most appropriate for the necessary adjustments. Al-
though one should always argue for the lowest possible 
taxation, when governments do not have the guts to de-
crease expenditures, increasing VAT seems like the best 
idea. Revenues and expenditures have to be balanced and 
times of scarce and expensive capital are not opportune 
for incurring new debts. According to Mihaljek (2009) 
the risk premium on external borrowing for the govern-
ment of Croatia has increased five times since mid 2008 
and twenty times since mid 2007.
In describing current policy responses, the OECD draft 
paper notes that »Some SEE countries are additionally 
funding state-owned development banks to facilitate 
lending to small and medium size enterprises, some even 
directing funds to specific industries or export oriented 
sectors«. It should be observed that the sources for these 
funds are questionable, with already overstretched budg-
ets, and that such measures could cause further distor-
tions, inefficiencies and increase corruption. For the same 
reasons it does not seem wise to subsidize interest rates 
on loans to firms and on credits to households (e.g. in Ser-
bia which already has external debt of around 65%).
»Some countries are increasing assistance to the poor-
est income groups... as lower income groups typically 
have a higher propensity to consume«. It is true that 
countries should support the poorest and carefully tar-
get the neediest. If overlooked, social aspects of the re-
cession might in some of the countries cause unrest 
which would destabilize these countries and adversely 
affect not only political but also the economic situation, 
e.g. causing a further decrease of foreign direct invest-
ments. However, the competencies of these countries’ 
administrations and necessary data-bases for targeting 
this kind of assistance might be questionable. 
Can recommendations meant for 
Croatia ring true for other countries  
of South East Europe?
As it would seem preposterous to give unique sugges-
tions to all countries across the region, the rest of this 
text will make basic recommendations for the country 
the author is best acquainted with, in the hope that they 
might be found of relevance for some other countries as 
well. 
The situation in Croatia is more similar to that in other 
SEE countries than many Croats are aware or would like 
to admit. The main problems in Croatia lay in high pub-
lic expenditures, high budget deficit, a high current ac-
count deficit, high public debt, high external debt, high 
unemployment and poor demographic prospects. The 
necessary steps to remedy these problems – cutting pub-
lic expenditures and carrying out institutional reforms 
i.e. reforming public administration, health, pension and 
welfare systems – despite of or even because of the re-
cession are obvious. 
In a short run, as soon as possible, Croatia should de-
crease its public expenditures, targeting the most bur-
densome public sector salaries and social benefits that 
make up 70% of total government expenditures, but also 
state aid and local government borrowing. If government 
cannot make such tough decisions it should as soon as 
possible increase the standard VAT rate and replace the 
zero rates with reduced VAT rates. Incurring further 
debts at extremely high prices is highly irresponsible to 
the new shrinking generations of further taxpayers. 
In the long run, the government should concentrate on 
structural reforms in employing, laying off and reward-
ing public sector employees plus reforms of welfare, 
health, education, pensions, state aid, and local and re-
gional administrations. Government should also better 
plan its finances, stop running them on a daily basis and 
stop accommodating to the pressures of various interest 
groups. 
Short term decreases of public expenditure will not suf-
fice without long-term reforms.
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